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NEXT 7 PAGES

OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE

OF THE

25X1A9a

1. Resume by [REDACTED]

25X1A9a

2. State Department Contacts by
(Tab 1)

25X1A9a

(not attached)

3. ODM Contacts and Accomplishments by
(Tab 2)

25X1A9a

(not attached)

4. KIC Contacts and Results by
(Tab 3)

[REDACTED]

of will not

5. Comments on DD/P Seminar by
(Tab 4)

6. Comments on DB/P Seminar by
(Tab 5)

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29 July 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to DD/I (Planning)

25X1A2g

SUBJECT: Resume of ORR Participation in [REDACTED]

REFERENCES:

1. Memo to CIA Emergency Planning Officer from Asst. to DD/I (Plng), 1 July 1958, "Objectives of DD/I Participation in Operation Alert 58"
2. Memo to Asst. to DD/I (Plng) from DAD/RR, 25 June 1958, "Operation Alert, 16-18 July 1958"

1. In your early discussions with me and other Office representatives concerning the plans for DD/I participation in OPA, 1958, you stressed the need for clarifying and testing possible wartime interagency relationships. This was spelled out in considerable detail in your memorandum of 1 July. While ORR agreed that your objective was a desirable one, this Office recognized a number of serious, practical limitations, and our reservations were communicated to you in [REDACTED] 25X1A9a

[REDACTED] memorandum of 25 June. In our contacts with other agencies just prior to the Alert, the limitations and problems which we had identified became even more apparent and were focused on one central fact, namely, the impossibility of one agency's attempting to test its interagency relationships without prior planning and agreement with those persons responsible for the Alert exercise in the other participating agencies. The exercise was useful in that it dramatized this fact, and it should stimulate those Agency personnel principally responsible for emergency planning to work with other agencies during the coming year so that Operation Alert 1959 will permit a more satisfactory testing of interagency arrangements.

2. Despite the practical limitations previously mentioned, we did plan four separate activities involving other agencies. In one case, requiring contacts with KIC members, we found that none of the KIC members were going to their relocation sites. In another, involving contact by two of our geographic people with the Office of the Director of Special Warfare (Department of the Army), we found that office was not participating in the exercise; moreover, if they had participated, it would have been at [REDACTED]. Cancellation of these activities left only [REDACTED] visit to the State Department, its [REDACTED] assignment with the [REDACTED] Economic Warfare Agency.

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3. [redacted] was the first of the [redacted] 25X1A9a personnel who visited another agency's relocation site. He and [redacted] 25X1A9a drove directly to that of the State Department and spent a day and a half there; following this, they returned to our [redacted] site. [redacted] is concerned about the amount of support that we might expect from the documents available at State and their general inadequacy. In particular, he noted that their Vital Materials had no subject code to facilitate recovery. On the other hand, it appears that they will become even more important customers of the CIA and will depend heavily upon us for support. His recommendation that we in the DD/I assign someone to State from one of the substantive Offices appears to warrant further consideration. 25X1A9a I might add that we did have a State Department liaison officer, [redacted] stationed in the DD/I area for at least one day. (See tab 1.) 25X1A9a

4. By prearrangement, [redacted] reported directly to the [redacted] Economic Warfare Agency at its relocation site and was made a member of their team for the duration of the exercise. This was the third year that OER personnel had participated in these arrangements, and [redacted] in his role as intelligence adviser, found that the intelligence function and its responsibility in relation to economic warfare is increasingly well understood by the participants at that relocation site. Unfortunately, the State Department had not advised the CIA relocation site of the details of one exercise in which CIA was expected to participate, and this did cause some confusion as indicated in the following paragraph. In addition, a message was sent from the KIC/S at the CIA relocation site to OER for OER which, when received, had no indication that a reply was requested. It is not known whether this omission occurred in the sending or in the receiving of the message. This confusion is also discussed in the following paragraph. [redacted] accompanied the OER team in its visit to the CIA relocation site and reported that members of this team were very well impressed with the setup there and the briefings they received. Finally, [redacted] indicated that during the OER exercise, it was decided that intelligence support should be performed through an intelligence division rather than through an intelligence staff. It is not clear precisely what would be involved in this; however, in view of the history of State-OER-CIA discussions on this matter, efforts should be made to clarify this. (See tab 2.) 25X1A9a

5. [redacted] although participating in the exercise in his capacity as Executive Secretary of the KIC, also provided assistance to the [redacted] Economic Warfare Agency by briefing officials of that organization who visited the CIA relocation site on the nature of economic intelligence assistance which might be provided to that agency in wartime. This was the first such visit of officials from that wartime agency and provided a useful supplement to [redacted] activities at the OER site 25X1A9a

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25X1A9a in clarifying the possible wartime relationships with that agency. [REDACTED] also participated in an exchange of messages with the OEMA in a test problem which the State Department had laid out prior to the exercise. The communications channels worked satisfactorily in this exchange of messages; however, there was some confusion arising from the CIA response which was brought about because State had not advised CIA of the code letters to be used in designating individual countries. On another hypothetical problem undertaken during the exercise, [REDACTED] addressed a message on 17 July to nine EIC agency relocation sites. By midmorning of the 18th, no replies had been received and a second message was transmitted requesting confirmation of receipt of the first message. As of the close of the exercise, CIA had received no replies to either message. Following the close of the exercise, a telephone check with the agencies concerned revealed a number of disturbing facts, including: the receipt of messages by certain agencies with omission of that portion of the text which requested a reply; in one case, the omission of the "Exercise [REDACTED] designator; a request by one agency for retransmission to clarify a garble followed by receipt of exactly the same garble in the return message; and, finally, the indication by two agencies that a reply had been sent which was never received by Mr. [REDACTED] at the CIA relocation center. This incredible confusion certainly warrants further investigation. [REDACTED] originally intended to prepare preliminary draft proposals relating to EIC war planning. His other activities prevented this; however, he did have some discussions with [REDACTED] and Mr. Iay, Executive Secretary of the NSC, on this subject and will recommend discussions within the EIC preparatory to the 1959 Alert test. (See tab 3.)

6. In accordance with instructions contained in paragraph 2a of your memorandum of 1 July, I proceeded to Area [REDACTED] on 16 July to take part in a seminar chaired by [REDACTED] USMC, who is, I understand, Chief of the [REDACTED] War Planners on the staff of the DD/P. On this trip, I took [REDACTED] of the Geographic Area, ORR, as observer. [REDACTED] of OCI was the other DD/I participant. This seminar had been held up awaiting our availability and [REDACTED] immediately started off with a few introductory remarks and asked me to lead off with a briefing on the DD/I. I had brought along an organization chart and, using this as a guide, I explained the missions and functions of the various units. Following this, I told them about the various assets that do not appear on the chart. These included something about the scientific, technical and research skills; the language and area knowledge; cartographic and geographic support available; [REDACTED] and its usefulness; photo interpretation; Map Library resources; current intelligence and briefing experience. I then told them about the types of support that we were presently providing the DD/P and the Military. I also explained about the role of the Research and Analysis Branch of ORR during World

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War II, both at headquarters and in the field, and pointed out the similarity between that and the present DD/I responsibilities. I concluded with a few comments about our present headquarters' customers and the types of reports that are prepared for them.

7. In the question-and-answer period that followed, I made it quite clear that we were speaking as individuals and not for the DD/I. I explained that most of the components of the DD/I had prepared some form of a War Plan primarily directed at headquarters' operations, but that these plans had not as yet been consolidated nor approved by the DD/I. The plans for theater support were, I said, still in the tentative stage, but that I expected that something more concrete might be expected within the next year. At this point, [REDACTED] of the Office of Security arose to tell us that he and [REDACTED] had been assigned to assist any component in reviewing War Plans for any Security guidance that might be required. 25X1A9a

8. The following morning, in addition to [REDACTED] I brought along [REDACTED] of the Economic Research Area of ORR to sit in as an observer and to clarify any points that might be raised in his area. [REDACTED] at this time gave a short talk on the capabilities of the Geographic Research Area and ably answered all questions put to him. Other speakers included representatives of the Medical Staff and Communications. Despite the fact that these briefings were set presumably for the benefit of the DD/P, there were none of the DD/P Divisions represented except for [REDACTED] and his aide. The others in attendance were from Personnel, Logistics, Security, Budget, General Counsel, and Communications, as well as Omar Pancoast of the DD/C. In any event, we received no guidance from the DD/P as to possible requirements they might levy upon us in the event of an emergency. 25X1A9a

9. During the afternoon of the 17th and much of the 18th, [REDACTED] turned to the subject of a proposed Augmentation Relocation Site. This became a controversial subject with practically everyone expressing his own opinion as to how large, where to locate, and whether it should be one large site or a series of sites. No conclusion was reached. The writer's own feeling was that the Augmentation Site could well be located about twenty-five miles away from the present site and be used primarily for living quarters, with the present site being maintained as the working area. I was afraid that too much decentralization would only multiply problems of communication, accessibility to Vital Materials, and joint efforts required to grid out quick answers to our primary customers. 25X1A9a

10. One point that [REDACTED] stressed was that any component of the Agency that did not have personnel in place in the theaters would

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have little or no chance of getting persons there after an emergency took place. He suggested that immediate steps be taken to have knowledgeable NS/I representatives make a YSI trip to the Senior War Planners of the Agency presently located in the Pacific and Europe for preliminary discussions about the NS/I and the part to be taken in the event of an emergency and to explore the possibilities of the assignments of NS/I War Planners of their immediate staffs. 25X1A9a

11. During the course of this exercise, [REDACTED] told us that the Inspector General is now taking a personal interest in the Agency war planning and is concerned with the lack of progress and overall coordination. I understood from [REDACTED] that a memorandum to this effect had been sent to the NSU for his consideration. 25X1A9a

12. [REDACTED] gave two presentations, describing in more detail the capabilities of the Geographic Area of OER. The criticisms and comments contained in his attached report are, for the most part, contained in the body of this memorandum. He does feel that the Offices of the NS/I have gone as far as possible in their emergency planning without now getting fuller cooperation from the NS/P and from other agencies. He is also quite concerned about survival training for employees. 25X1A9a

13. [REDACTED] of the Economic Area of OER came to the War Plans Seminar primarily as an observer. His notes, attached, are slightly misleading. To my recollection, no discussions were held which defined the specific Office plans of the NS/I for theater operations except as I touched upon them generally during my first day's briefing to the War Plans Seminar. At this time, [REDACTED] was not present. At that time, as I have already indicated, I did try to cover the entire NS/I capabilities. Much of the rest of his report relates to the discussion of the proposed Augmentation Site, which, as I stated earlier, is far from resolved. 25X1A9a

14. To sum up, I feel that the operation served a useful purpose in these ways:

a. Visits were made to the relocation sites of both the State Department and the OER, and the basis for future relationships was established.

b. A visit by some of the OER and State personnel gave them a better appreciation of our capabilities to support their war-time activities.

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3. A fair test was made of our communications net and some of its shortcomings were made clear.

4. The DD/P War Planners and components of DD/S have a clearer idea of the role of the DD/I in peace and war.

15. Recommendations would include the following:

a. that a DD/I War Planning Committee be established as soon as possible;

b. 25X1A9a that the members of this committee attend the War Planners School ([REDACTED] and I were the first DD/I personnel to attend this course, and I understand that [REDACTED] is about to take it);

c. that the DD/I personally indicate his interest in the subject and establish some guidelines for this planning group and for the IAD's;

d. that an attempt be made to form a representative group of IAC representatives to develop plans for coordination of future Alerts or actual emergency activities;

e. that our relocation site be used for the holding of planning sessions of several days' duration, with representatives of other parts of the Agency and other agencies in attendance; and

f. 25X1A9a that consideration by the DD/I be given to the recommendation of [REDACTED] that a knowledgeable DD/I representative be sent on TDY to the CIA Senior War Planners for discussions as to the part the DD/I could play in assisting in the initial planning and the augmentation of the CIA theater staffs.

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[REDACTED]

Office for Special Projects
Research and Reports

Attachments:

Items 1-5, as listed
in the Index